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1 One  of  popular  science’s  primary  functions  is  to  make  what  would  otherwise  be
inaccessible, specialist knowledge accessible to the lay reader. But popular science puts
its imagined reader in something of a dilemma, for one does not have to look very far
to find bitter argument among science writers; argument that takes place beyond the
limits of the scientific community: witness the ill-tempered exchanges between Mary
Midgley and Richard Dawkins in the journal Philosophy in the late seventies and early
eighties;  or,  from the mid-nineties,  the surly dialogue of  Stephen Jay Gould,  Daniel
Dennett, and others in The New York Review of Books (see below and Works Cited). These
writers,  communicators,  and  educators  have  played  a  significant  part  in  the
dissemination  of  evolutionary  theory  among  non-specialists;  they  have  shaped  the
understanding and use of genetic and evolutionary theory in non-scientific areas of
academic study and cultural theory. Such vociferous disagreements as they have had
are, then, of some public significance.
2 This article is not concerned primarily with the issue of influence, however. Rather,
given the influence these and other writers have – and given their disputes with one
another –  I  want to ask:  when stark disagreement arises,  how is  the interested lay
reader to make sense of such disagreement, when it is to these writers she looks for her
scientific knowledge in the first place? How are we to engage with and evaluate the
contributions of our teachers, when our teachers are engaged in fierce argument with
one another?
3 To anticipate some of what is to follow: one problem for us “lay” readers is that some
science writers get sidetracked by questions of who among them is “right” or “wrong.”
Such an eristic attitude, I suggest, mistakes just what is undertaken – and just what is at
stake – in populist theorizing (as opposed to populist reporting in, say, the pages of New
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Scientist  or  Scientific  American).  In  the  context  of  pop  science,  questions  of  who  is
“absolutely right” or “absolutely wrong” are less interesting, and in many ways less
important, than questions of who is most theoretically coherent and most convincing;
of who, to use Nelson Goodman’s vocabulary, offers us an account that seems to provide
a “right fit” (Goodman 1978). The lay reader has little choice but to take the expertise
of the science writer on trust (although this does not rule out the possibility of an
expert being disavowed by most or even all of his scientific community, on scientific
grounds). But, as we will see, the terms in which a science writer couches her narrative
have little to do with scientific practice, per se. It is with these terms – what I shall call
the concept metaphors of science writing – that the lay reader can engage critically;
and it is here that pragmatism enters the stage.
4 My thesis is not that readers do not have to be scientists to make either heads or tails of
popular science, so long as they are well versed in the various dialects of pragmatism.
Rather, a pragmatist approach to our problem will help ground and justify not only my
readings of Dawkins, Dennett, and Gould, but also my larger claim that there is plenty
of critical space, as it were, in popular science for non-scientist readers.
5 If one aim of popular science is to educate Joe Public, then the genre aims to speak
across  boundaries  –  from the  province  of  Professional  Expertise  to that  of  General
Interest.  Surely,  then,  such  speech  should  not  be  one-way,  but,  rather,  part  of  a
conversation;1 surely, the occupants of General Interest’s territory should find a way of
taking their conversational turn. This article is just such an attempt.
6 I  first  establish  a  theoretical  framework  –  which  draws  heavily  on  pragmatist
philosophy – for the investigations of Dawkins, Dennett, and Gould that follow. Here, I
also attempt to clear up what I  think are some misapprehensions about our chosen
mode of popular science and its appropriate disciplinary reach. A detailed concluding
section explores the reasons for favouring the pop-science work of Gould over that of
Dawkins.  These “case studies” are shaped by the pragmatist  framework outlined in
earlier sections.2
 
“Mission Creep:” Generic “Purity” and the Function of
Pop Science
7 Robert Eaglestone (2005) has argued that popular science is characterized by an inbuilt
“mission  creep,”  whereby  the  claims  of  the  genre,  which  by  definition  aspires  to
popular  appeal,  cease  to  be  strictly  scientific  and  encroach  on  the  realms  of  the
philosophical. Writers make their narratives attractive to lay readers “by showing why
the subject […] is relevant and meaningful for everyone, and this is usually done by
making much bigger claims. […] It is the very need for these more general claims that
makes these popular science books unavoidably ‘philosophical’ in that they perforce
and explicitly address ‘what it is to be’.” The issue here, then, is perhaps not so much
the extra scientific pretensions of science, but the necessary pretensions of these books
to address a wider readership.
8 Eaglestone refers several times to Dawkins, who states in The Selfish Gene that, thanks to
Darwin (and the neo-Darwinist synthesis of genetics and evolutionary theory), “[w]e no
longer have to resort to superstition when faced with the deep problems: Is there a
meaning to life? What are we here for? What is man?” However, despite evolutionary
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theory’s triumphs, students of the biological sciences tend to miss Darwin’s “profound
philosophical significance. Philosophy and the subjects known as ‘humanities’ are still
taught almost as if Darwin had never lived.” (Dawkins 2006, 1.)
9 The  “extra-scientific  pretensions”  of  these  early  remarks  are  clear  enough,  as  are
Dawkins’s intentions to appeal to a “lay” as well as specialist readership (see Dawkins
2006,  xxi,  xxii);  with Dawkins as  our model,  then,  Eaglestone certainly seems to be
right. But Eaglestone’s comments are less true of the popular science genre per se than
of Dawkins particularly. The problem with Dawkins, in the lines quoted above, is not
that he falls  foul of  popular science’s inbuilt  “mission creep” (which for Eaglestone
seems to be a problem of genre); the problem is Dawkins’s disciplinary reductionism. As
Dawkins imagines things, the humanities sit further up the disciplinary hierarchy, and
are  therefore logically  dependent  on  the  natural  sciences  for  their  foundations.
Dawkins assumes that science, dealing with “bare facts,” is more fundamental than the
humanities, and that, consequently, other academic fields are somehow reducible to
science  (or,  rather,  his  branch  and  brand of  it):  it  is  neo-Darwinism that  can  now
answer  the  “big”  questions,  because  it  sits  at  the  base  of  Dawkins’s  imagined
disciplinary hierarchy.
10 But to be dissatisfied with Dawkins’s hierarchism and reductionism is not to say that
the blurring of boundaries between science and philosophy amounts to a real problem.
For  Quine,  indeed,  philosophy  and science  sat  on  the  same continuum;  philosophy
simply operated to a greater degree of  generality and abstractness (see,  e.g.,  Quine
1963). For Richard Rorty (2009b), one of the oddities of philosophy is that it seems to
exhibit, simultaneously, the hallmarks of what many would consider the arts and the
sciences.  And  Daniel  Dennett  writes,  with  a  certain  commonsense  directness,  that
“there  is  no  such  thing  as  philosophy-free  science;  there  is  only  science  whose
philosophical  baggage  is  taken on  board  without  examination.”  (Dennett  1995,  21.)
Turn,  say,  to  John  Dewey,  and  we  find  just  the  sort  of  grand  philosophical  claim,
extrapolated  from  scientific  theory,  of  which  Eaglestone  is  so  wary.  For  Dewey,
Darwinism marks something very much like what we would now call,  post Kuhn, a
paradigm  shift.  But  this  paradigm  shift  completes  a  general  conceptual  shift  to  a
perspective from which all our cultural life looks as though it is constantly in flux, as
though it rests on foundations that are neither sure nor fixed (Dewey 1997).
11 In sort, “big” philosophical claims seem hardly to be avoided in works that deal with
“big” scientific  theories.  (Note,  too,  that  the examples  given above are  all  made of
science  from  the  side  of  philosophy;  would  we  be  concerned  to  challenge  these
thinkers’  extra-philosophical  pretensions?)  The injunction that  pop science keep to
itself  and  not  mingle  with  philosophy  is  unrealizable;  the  careers  of  science  and
philosophy have been entwined for too long.3
12 The problem, then, is  not that Dawkins,  or indeed any pop-science writer,  dares to
make grand philosophical claims. The questions to be asked, rather, are: (1) are the
disputants’ grand claims clear, convincing; do they offer a “right fit;” or, to paraphrase
Goodman (and to pull him out of context), do they manage to sell their ideas rather
than prove them?4 (2)  How is  the non-specialist  who relies  on pop science for  her
scientific literacy to address (1)?
13 As we will see, arguments – often heated – between the neo- or ultra-Darwinist and
Radical Science camps sometimes hinge on the terms in which the camps’ respective
arguments are couched. One prong of Dennett’s attack on Gould, for example, is shaped
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by an attempt to “prove” Gould and Lewontin’s  notion of  “spandrels” (summarized
below) a nonsense; in Dennett’s view, “spandrels” is an unworkable theory because it is
founded on a duff analogy. I will argue, though, that Dennett misses his mark because
the relationship between Gould’s evolutionary theory and the architectural structure
to which it is supposedly analogous does, in fact, hold good: it is, to borrow again from
Goodman, a good fit, convincingly sold.
14 Before we turn to particular case studies, though, we will need to give some time to the
idea  of  metaphor  generally,  for  while  both  Midgley  and  Dawkins  discuss  “gene
selfishness” as a metaphor, we will see that it is necessary to qualify with some care the
sort of metaphor we are likely to be dealing with in popular science. Some detail will be
needed; in the readings of Dawkins, Dennett, and Gould that follow, the problems and
disputes we will tackle are very much over conceptions of metaphor itself, and writers’
metaphorical language use. First, then, let us spend a little time on just some of what
has been said of metaphor in general, as well as some of the sticking-points of these
general accounts. I will turn briefly to remarks made by Rorty, Davidson, and Goodman.
 
Rorty, Davidson, Goodman; Language and Metaphor5
15 For Rorty, the ways in which we understand the world are constituted by language,
which is fundamentally metaphorical: language does not take us closer to or further
from things as they are “in themselves;” rather it makes and remakes the world as we
understand  or  interpret  it  (Rorty  1989,  16).6 Language,  as  Rorty  understands  it,
constitutes our hermeneutic relationship with a real world that is “out there,” but is
neither  more  nor  less  “really”  or  “truthfully”  represented  in,  say,  Einsteinian  or
Newtonian terms.
16 On this  view, then,  a  metaphor does not disguise yet somehow “contain” its  literal
meaning; it consists in the use of “familiar words in unfamiliar ways” (Rorty 1989, 18).
Similarly, literal words are not transparent windows onto the world; they are simply
metaphors that,  through repeated and therefore increasingly comfortable use,  have
gained general currency. “Literal” words are metaphors, the metaphoricity of which we
have forgotten.
17 Metaphors, in Rorty’s sense, introduce new concepts or conceptual frameworks. The
difference between literal and metaphorical language, then, is that the “literal uses of
noises and marks are the uses we can handle by our old theories about what people will
say under various conditions. Their metaphorical use is the sort which makes us get
busy developing a new theory.” (Rorty 1989, 17.) Rortyan metaphor is determined by its
effects; but because language, for Rorty, neither moves us closer to nor further from
the world in itself, metaphorical effect is measured by whether or not a new concept
forces us to start re-theorizing or redescribe the world.
18 Rorty,  of  course,  draws  heavily  on  Donald  Davidson,  whose 1978  paper  “What
Metaphors Mean” has attained a level of notoriety among philosophers of language and
theorists of metaphor. Metaphor is commonly understood, Davidson summarizes, as
language that encodes “hidden” meanings, that says one thing while meaning another.
But, he argues, “[w]e must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it
has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning)” (Davidson 1978, 45).
From the get-go, Davidson maintains that “metaphors mean what the words, in their
most literal interpretation mean, and nothing more” (1978, 32). Metaphor, in Davidson
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(1978,  33),  is  not  language  that  runs  on  the  “dual  tracks”  of  literal  and  hidden
meanings, or of the said and the meant; it is an issue not of language and meaning, but of
language in use.
19 A proper account of metaphor, Davidson believes, is simple enough. It requires not the
formulation or discovery of rules for decoding metaphorical “meanings”; there are, in
this account, neither such rules nor such meanings. What we might call the standard
theories of metaphor – the dual track accounts – “mistake their goal,” Davidson writes.
20 Where they think they provide a method for deciphering an encoded content,  they
actually tell us (or try to tell us) something about the effects metaphors have on us. The
common error is to fasten on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes and to
read those contents into the metaphor itself (Davidson 1978, 45).
21 Davidson insists that metaphors belong to the “domain” of use, not of meaning. The
unfamiliar,  jarring  quality  of  a  well-chosen metaphor  will  lead  us  to  make various
associations, but there is no rule as to what these associations will be, and no necessary
end to the stream of associations: “When we try to say what a metaphor ‘means,’ we
soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention.” (Davidson 1978, 46.) Here, a
metaphor  can  denote  no  more  than  it  does  literally,  but  it  can  connote  endlessly;
metaphor functions in non-determinate, metonymic fashion.
 
Goodman versus Davidson on Metaphor
22 If  it  is  hard,  perhaps  impossible,  to  specify  in  advance  the  limits  of  so-called
“metaphorical meaning,” then there is a sense in which Davidson is absolutely right
about there being no necessary end to the associative power of metaphors. Nevertheless,
it  surely  is possible  objectively  to  misconstrue  metaphors.  There  are boundaries  to
metaphorical  meaning,  but  these  boundaries  are  often unmarked;  they may not  be
noticed until we are either up against or have strayed clear across them.
23 While certain paraphrases, interpretations, explanations of a particular metaphor are
accepted as plausible, others are eventually rejected. This might be because: (1) some
interpretations of metaphor seem to lead us more than reasonably far from an author’s
apparent or likely intentions. (2) We might reject interpretations because the literal, or
“first,” meanings of the metaphorical terms have been misunderstood.7 (3) A metaphor
may be misconstrued because the object or referent under metaphorical description is
not clearly known.8 
24 In short, although one can never say with absolute certainty what the meaning of a
metaphor is, few people object to the principle that some interpretations of metaphors
are better, more reasonable, more plausible, or more useful than others. Just how apt
our understandings or interpretations of metaphors are deemed to be will depend, in
part, on linguistic communities – or, to put it in terms closer to Goodman (1978), the
symbolic worlds9 – of which we find ourselves part. Synchronically or diachronically,
the  individual,  of  course,  may  operate  in  more  than  one  community  or  world.
Regardless,  the  point  is  this:  in  practice,  metaphorical  utterances  –  despite their
infinite possibility –  are unlikely to be quite so open-ended as Davidson suggests,  as
certain meanings, uses, interpretations will have greater or lesser sway in certain
linguistic communities.
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25 The logical conclusion of Davidson’s metaphor paper is the loss of any line between
literal and metaphorical meaning. Yet this is a line which seems, in most accounts –
Davidson’s included – to be presupposed. Goodman makes the forceful point that if
Davidson is even half-right to suggest that as metaphors pass from “life” to “death”
their  meanings  do  not  change,  then  there  must  be  something  akin  to  a  literal/
metaphorical difference that marks metaphors as such upon first utterance. If this is
true, then it would seem to be the case that for Davidson, even as he argues against this
distinction, metaphorical figures do mean otherwise than literal ones (Goodman 1979,
127).
26 Goodman,  by  contrast,  wishes  to  guard the  metaphorical/literal  distinction that  he
believes  Davidson  fails  to  give  up;  indeed,  he  seems  to  take  it  as  essential  to  the
constitution and very possibility of metaphor. Goodman would have us use something
like the following definition:
“The lake is a sapphire is literally false but metaphorically true” is true if and only if “
The lake is a sapphire is metaphorically true” is literally true.10
27 There is a significant difference for Goodman between an utterance being literally false
but metaphorically true, and an utterance being merely false. Metaphorical utterances,
then,  require  listener-interpreters  to  sort  through  permutations  of  literal/
metaphorical truth/falsity, just because metaphor involves the reassignment of labels
(a claim close to Rorty’s): “a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a past and
an object that yields while protesting,” Goodman writes. “Where there is metaphor,
there is conflict [...] Application of a term is metaphorical only if to some extent contra-
indicated.”  (1976,  69.)  Goodman’s  definition  also  allows,  for  example,  the  possible
literal and metaphorical truth of Frost’s verse, “Two roads diverged in a yellow wood.”
28 Goodman and Davidson are not so incompatible as may at first appear, however, if we
turn from Davidson’s account of metaphor and meaning, to his Tarskian conception of
truth and meaning (see Davidson 1967, 1983). In Ways of Worldmaking (1978), Goodman’s
central claim is that our various symbolic systems – be they linguistic or not – structure
our worlds in very real (one is tempted to say “very literal”) ways. In claiming this, we
can view Goodman as offering a sort  of  Davidsonian pluralism. Davidson’s  Tarskian
definition  of  truth  might  hold  good  for  both  metaphorical  and  literal  utterances,
provided  we  know,  pace Goodman,  what  symbolic  world  or  system  we  are “in.”
Goodman’s definition, as summarized above, can be restated as:
“The lake is a sapphire” is true in a given symbolic system if and only if in that
system the lake is a sapphire.11
29 But  if  we take  it  for  granted that  all  utterances  occur  in  some given context  (and
possibly  more  than  one  context  simultaneously),12 then  we  can  further  restate  the
above in Davidson’s terms. The difference between definitions closer in form to either
Goodman’s or Davidson’s is the difference between making the fuzzy notion of context
explicit in the definition or taking it out and, therefore, for granted:
“The lake is a sapphire” is true [in a given symbolic system] if and only if [in
that system] the lake is a sapphire.
30 In short, if we know “how” a sentence is intended (as metaphor, for example), then we
will be able to determine its truth or falsity.13 Another way of putting this: provided
that  interlocutors  understand  and  interpret  the  context  of  utterance  in  broadly
overlapping ways, then Goodman’s explanation of metaphor accommodates Davidson’s
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theory  of  truth,  and  vice  versa.  Goodman  does  not  cancel  out  Davidson’s  theory  of
metaphor; he simply does not go near it.
31 In a sense, then, metaphor is a matter of use, but not in the way Davidson suggests. Our
ability  to  perform  the  literal/metaphorical  truth-sortings  suggested  by  Goodman
depends  on  us  rightly  interpreting  the  context  of  use  (that  a  sentence  has  been
intended metaphorically and/or literally); but this does not mean that, in the context
of  a  linguistic  community or symbolic world,  the meaning-effects  of  metaphors are
indefinitely “open.”
32 What may seem like a digression from our primary task should stand us in good stead
for what is  to come. The possibility for non-scientists’  critical  engagement lies in a
recognition that science writers, as science writers, are writers first, scientists second.
Of course, there are many science writers who are scientists; but science writing, as we
will see, is open to the same aesthetic, hermeneutic and logical criticisms and debates
as is almost all narrative or so-called “creative” writing. We will also see that so much
of the animosity among competing pop-science theories and pop-science writers is not,
in fact, over the science itself, but over the metaphors and theoretical frameworks that
have been built around common scientific “facts.” The disagreements, in other words,
are not fundamentally scientific, but aesthetic and, primarily, interpretive.
33 Despite much impressive philosophical work on metaphor, there is no one theory that
can specify either the necessary and sufficient conditions of metaphor as such, or all
the  ways  in  which  metaphors  might  mean.  Where  science  writers  argue  over  the
appositeness of a particular metaphor, we will find that more thought needs to be given
to just what metaphors are thought to be and how they are thought to function in the
context of popular science. In light of the foregoing discussion, it will emerge that what is
needed is not the theory of metaphor, but occasional theories for certain contexts of
metaphorical  occurrence.  We will  have reason to distinguish,  in a rough, schematic
way, between passing metaphors and concept metaphors, and between metaphors (or
poetic metaphors) and models (or scientific metaphors).
 
Metaphors and Models
34 The problems of metaphor are particularly pertinent to the type of popular science
that concerns us. Consider Richard Dawkins’s and Mary Midgley’s arguments over the
notion of the selfish gene. The argument was, in one sense, over theory, but it hinged
on the understanding of metaphor – what metaphor is, how it functions, how it is to be
used – not on the understanding of what genes are.
35 Midgley objects to the use of “selfishness” as a metaphor for explaining gene activity.
She  objects  because  Dawkins  himself  characterizes  his  special,  theoretical  use  of
“selfishness”  as  a  metaphor,  but  does  not  –  to  use  one  of  Midgley’s  metaphors  –
sufficiently “prune” this figure of its unusable branches (Midgley 1979, 447-48). A little
more care with just how metaphors operate is needed, she argues. Note that in the
following passage, context is all. Midgley begins by talking about metaphors in science
writing; we must not take what follows as a commentary on metaphor in general:
To understand how metaphors can properly be used in scientific writing, we must
get  straight  a  fundamental  point  about  the  relation  between  metaphors  and
models. Every metaphor suggests a model; indeed, a model is itself a metaphor, but
one which has been carefully pruned. Certain branches of it are safe; others are not,
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and it is the first business of somebody who proposes a new model to make this
distinction clear. Once this is done, the unusable parts of the original metaphor
must be sharply avoided; it is no longer legitimate to use them simply as stylistic
devices. (Midgley 1979, 447; emphasis in original.)
36 Clarification is needed of the metaphor/model relationship to which Midgley refers.
With  The  lake  is  a  sapphire as  our  example,  Midgley  would  seem  to  be  saying  that
sapphire suggests some sort of model for lake, and that, as a model for lake, sapphire may
also function as a metaphor “for” lake. This is fine, as far as it goes, but it takes us in a
circle that adds little to any theoretical understanding of metaphor.
37 Let us take another sentence – one that may or may not, depending on the context of
use, contain a metaphor – and let us call again upon Goodman, this time on his analysis
of denotation and exemplification (Goodman 1976, 45-67): He is a murderer. He refers to
(denotes) a particular man, who in turn exemplifies that pronoun. Similarly, murderer
denotes our man, who stands, again, in a relationship of exemplification to that label.
In this sentence, then, he and murderer are coextensive, but not identical, terms. The
difference  between  denotation  and  exemplification  is  more  helpful  than  Midgley’s
metaphor/model relationship; denotation/exemplification makes explicit a distinction
Midgley seems only to gesture towards,  and it  pulls  us out of  Midgley’s  circularity.
Treating The lake as a single lexeme (The-lake),  the same relationships of denotation,
exemplification,  and  coextensiveness  obtain  for  The-lake and  sapphire (in  the
metaphorical figure) as they did for He and murderer (in a figure that may or may not be
metaphorical).14 In this context of occurrence, a-sapphire denotes simultaneously any
sapphire and the lake (this is not the same as saying that a-sapphire now “means” our
particular lake);  but a-sapphire is also exemplified by the lake (or some of its as yet
unspecified quality or qualities).
38 Whereas Midgley vaguely suggests, but does not explicate, some sort of equivalence
between  metaphors  and  models,  denotation  and  exemplification  in  Goodman  are
logically by asymmetrically related: “while anything may be denoted, only labels may
be exemplified” (Goodman 1976, 57). Here, then, is what exemplification adds to our
understanding of metaphor: labels can be exemplified by the things they denote, but
they are not exemplified exhaustively (see Goodman 1976, 52-57). Replacing Midgley’s
metaphor/model  relationship  with  that  of  denotation,  exemplification,  and
coextensiveness, we can see that Midgley is quite right about metaphors, in the context
of science writing, needing to be pruned. The possibilities for the metaphorical truth-
sorting of the ways in which our imagined lake might exemplify the various qualities of
is a sapphire are broad; too broad, certainly, for the purposes of most, if not all, science
writing. Genes are selfish, for example, must surely mean something rather well specified
if it is to be scientifically instructive in the ways Dawkins wishes it to be. Both Goodman
and Davidson believe that  metaphor has  its  role  in  the advancement of  knowledge
(scientific or otherwise) (Goodman 1979, 125; Davidson 2006a, 210); but in the context
of popular science and science writing, metaphors can hardly be left open to either the
truth-/falsity-sortings  of  Goodman,  or  the  individualistic  meaning-as-affect
formulation  of  Davidson.15 Equally,  though,  there  is  clearly  something  more  than
dealings in “dead” or “frozen” metaphors going on in the most interesting pop-science
texts.
39 Before moving on, let us sketch some rough terminological distinctions.
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40 (1) Elsewhere, I have sought to replace the binary of dead and live metaphors with the
non-binary  distinction  of  passing  and  concept  metaphors  (see  Belas,  forthcoming).
Passing metaphors are those the understanding of which requires little work, while
concept metaphors are those on which understanding, or successful communication,
depends, and which require some interpretive work.
41 Passing metaphors often, though not of necessity, take the form of verbs or adjectives:
when, for example, Goodman writes that a metaphor that no longer excites interest or
wonder  “wilts”  (1979,  127),  he  offers  no  sort  of  explanation  of  his  metaphor;  the
presumption seems to be that none is needed. Similarly, Midgley, writing about science
writing, does not feel compelled to explicate the meaning of “pruned,” qua metaphor,
even  though  she  is  writing  of  the  importance  of  the  metaphorical  pruning  of
metaphors in science writing.
42 Concept metaphors are often, though not of necessity, nouns. Concept metaphors do
require  interpretive  effort,  and  may  evoke  interest,  wonder,  even  confusion.  For
concept  metaphors  to  function  appropriately  in  science  writing,  much  of  the
interpretive work is done for the reader (see, for example, the analyses of selfish gene,
gene selfishness, and spandrels below); that is, they are – or, pace Midgley, should be –
sufficiently  pruned.  Concept  and  passing  metaphors  are  distinct  from  so-called
“frozen” or “dead” metaphor and their – by extension – “liquid” or “live” counterparts
for  the  simple  reason  that  one  speaker’s  idiom  or  cliché  may  –  at  least  on  first
encounter – be another’s metaphor, full of wonder, confusion, and possibility.
43 (2)  Where  Midgley  presupposes  but  does  not  fully  explain  the  difference  between
models  and  metaphors,  I  propose  that  “model”  be  understood  as  a  certain  use  or
application of metaphor. “Models,” for our purposes, are the metaphors characteristic
of  science  writing  –  those  carefully  “pruned,”  specified,  or  narrowed  figures  that
Midgley seems to have in mind, the purpose of which is to clarify and illustrate. Models
can  be  distinguished  from the  metaphors  characteristic  of  poetry,  which  compress
possible  meanings  into  single  figures  and invite  a  wealth  of  interpretations.  Poetic
metaphor is not only to be found in poetry, but it is one mode by which Pound’s notion
of “language charged with meaning” is enacted (Pound 1934, 28).
44 Call  the difference I  have outlined the difference between metaphors,  as  such,  and
models; or, the difference between the metaphors (characteristic) of science, and those
(characteristic) of poetry. The differences between these may not be categorical; but,
like the metaphors most obviously characteristic of and appropriate to science writing,
they offer a useful conceptual shorthand. With this rough difference in mind, we can
ask questions like, how well does the notion of evolutionary “spandrels” fit,  or map to, the
model  of  architectural  spandrels?;  or, what  refinements  need  to  be  made  to  the  everyday
meaning of “selfishness” in order for “gene selfishness” to do any useful theoretical work?
45 The following analyses of Dawkins and Gould are analyses not of poetic metaphor but of
models.  Our  job  is  to  assess  the  cogency  of  special,  theoretical  terms  (such  as
“spandrels” and “selfishness”) as models. The conceptual models used by Dawkins and
Gould can ill afford, in the first instance, the free-associative openness of Davidsonian
metaphor,  or  even  the  latitude  of  partial  exemplification  and  truth-sorting  of
Goodman. However, while we are dealing with models, not poetic metaphors, I want to
show  that  models  can  still  have  Rortyan  redescriptive  force.  Models  (or  science
metaphors) are not “dead” metaphors, but a variety of concept metaphor; they are not
a different “species” of concept metaphor (different, say, from the concept metaphors
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encountered in poetry), but rather concept metaphors with generic conventions of use
– namely, that their applicative range is tightly specified and explicated in advance;
such  is  generally  not  the  case  with  poetic  metaphors.  Indeed,  by  distinguishing
between poetic and science metaphors, or metaphors and models, we are pointing to
this generic-conventional distinction in concept metaphors. Later, we will see that one
of the reasons Dawkins’s concept of “gene selfishness” comes unstuck is a deficient
understanding of metaphors and models; by contrast, we will find that Gould’s model of
evolutionary spandrels is far more clearly mapped to its architectural “original” than
Dennett realizes.
 
Dawkins and his Critics
46 First and foremost, Dawkins’s critics are exercised by his “metaphorical” choices, the
effects  of  which  are  twofold:  firstly,  Dawkins’s  language  has,  for  many,  a  political
resonance which seems commensurate with a rugged individualism, a sense of society
as an “arms race,”16 an all-against-all competition in which things just are the way they
are and are no better than they can possibly be, for evolution always works towards
optimal fitness.17 Secondly, the image of gene science itself which Dawkins’s language
presents us has been criticized. I will focus primarily on the second criticism, though
one cannot avoid the first entirely; for a theorist of science like Rose (1997), language
can both have ideologically invidious effects and be scientifically misleading.
47 With Dawkins’s focus, particularly in his earlier works, almost exclusively on the gene
as the fundamental unit of natural selection, both Midgley and Rose argue that Dawkins
and other “ultra-Darwinists” misleadingly present a picture of the gene as atom-like –
an indivisible and ubiquitous basic unit – whereas, in fact, genes are variable in size,
and are best understood in holistic, rather than atomistic, terms (Midgley 1979, 449,
450; Rose 1997, 216).
48 Rose  also  emphasizes  the  influence  of  expert  or  professional  perspective  on  our
preferred narratives (Rose 1997, 10-11). For example, rather than thinking in terms of
one-to-one correspondences between single genes and their phenotypic expression, the
biochemist  will  think  in  terms  of  genetic  pathways  and  the  emergence  of
characteristics (such as eye colour) due to the interactions of many chemical agents.
This, claims Rose (1997, 115), is “the distinction between a developmental and genetic
approach.”  Indeed,  he  states  that  “all  biologists  know”  that  this  biochemical
perspective is the more accurate description of genetic makeup and “behaviour,” and
that talk of a single gene “for x […] is merely a convenient shorthand” (Rose 1997, 115).
Rose  dislikes  that  Dawkins  recognizes  this  fact  while  insisting  it  does  not  matter
“provided the system behaves as if such ‘genes for’ existed” (Rose 1997, 116).
49 Dawkins presents an idea of a federation of more or less independent genes doing what
they are meant to do for their own good; so the very idea of “gene selfishness” is tied
up with talk of “one gene for x.” However, Midgley, like Rose, argues that Dawkins fails
to  acknowledge  that  in  fact  many  genes  are  involved  in  indivisible  phenotypic
phenomena;  this  being  the  case, gene  behaviour  is  surely  better  described  as
cooperative (Midgley 1979, 448-49). Already, then, we can discern what in our terms is a
simplistically Rortyan programme, directed at the public rather than specialist sphere.
Rose and Midgley attempt to spur a public shift of imagination, a thinking otherwise,
from “genes are ‘selfish’ atoms” to “genes are cooperative networks.”
Popular Science, Pragmatism, and Conceptual Clarity
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-1 | 2014
10
50 Along  still  similar  lines  to  Rose,  Midgley  complains  that  Dawkins  appears  to
acknowledge  the  variability  of  the  gene  while  all  the  time  writing  about  its
immutability and permanence through space and time (Midgley 1979, 450): surely he
cannot have things all ways. However, to accuse Dawkins, as Rose and Midgley do, of
disseminating the gene-as-indivisible-atom image is somewhat misleading. Drawing on
George Williams, Dawkins actually defines the gene as “any portion of chromosomal
material which potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural
selection” (Dawkins 2006, 28). And, responding directly to Midgley’s criticism of The
Selfish Gene, Dawkins attempts to clarify and correct: “I am not searching for an ideal,
indivisible, atom-like unit. I am searching for a chunk of chromosomal material which,
in practice, behaves as a unit for long enough to be naturally selected at the expense of
another such fuzzy unit.” (Dawkins 1981, 569, emphasis added.)
51 The disagreement between Dawkins, on one flank, and Rose and Midgley, on the other,
is  not really over basic definitions of the gene.  Both Rose and Midgley believe that
Dawkins  shares  –  with  them  and  the  scientific  community  –  the  same  basic
understanding of what the gene is. But they believe, too, that this basic understanding
and its clear expression are obscured by Dawkins’s language. The points of contention
are over: 1) whether or not the gene really is the basic unit of natural selection; 2) the
most appropriate linguistic figures used to discuss this supposed unit. For Dawkins the
basic unit is the single gene; for Rose and Midgley it is the organism, as talk of a single
gene  for  x may be convenient  in some situations,  but  is  ultimately inaccurate,  even
nonsensical (Midgley 1979, 448-49). Rose rejects Dawkins’s revised dualism (the digital
gene now takes the place of the “soul,” travelling in the analogue husks we like to think
of as our corporeal selves [see Rose 1997, 212-14]). His insistence on the language of
cooperation  (pressed,  too,  by  Midgley)  encapsulates  his  characterization  of  the
organism as just that: a complex, integrated, cooperative system; a unit, rather than a
federation of individual, and individualistic, genes. As examples, Rose looks to human
sexual  reproduction  and  the  overproduction  of  sperm,  and  to  the  overproduction
during brain development of neurons and synapses.  The success of  one (one sperm
fuses with the ovum; one neuron-synapse connects with the dendrite of the target cell)
in the face of vast overproduction might be interpreted in competitive terms. But the
chances of one neuron and synapse, or a single sperm, succeeding if it were the only one
may  be  slight  (Rose,  1997,  143-53):  if  this  is  so,  “cooperation,”  rather  than
“competition,” may be a better model.
52 “Competition” may be misleading, particularly if not shorn of its demotic and economic
connotations, for it fails to convey the sense of organismic harmony Rose wishes to
promote and which he believes is the case. From Rose’s perspective, to say that systems
behave as if there is a gene for x is to fudge the issue; systems do not operate as if this
were the case; they cannot, because there is no such single gene for x.  “Thinking of
genes as individual units which determine eye colour may not matter too much,” Rose
(1997, 116) worries, “but how about when they become ‘gay genes’ or ‘schizophrenic
genes’  or  ‘aggression  genes’?”  (Such  one-to-one  gene-phenotype  reductionism,  it  is
worth  noting,  also  fails  to  explain  sufficiently  many  of  the  most  serious  genetic
illnesses [see Rennie 1994].) Note that we are talking here not of the cultural-political
resonances of  science  metaphors,  or  models,  but  of  cultural-political  positions  into
which particular styles of the sciences’ dissemination might play. So, although one gene
for  x may be  a  convenient  façon  de  parler,  if  it  has  clouded scientific  thinking  it  is
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reasonable to think that in the context of popular science it will mislead many readers,
who, as non-experts, may be particularly receptive to the models offered us.
 
The Intentional Stance, Conceptual Clarity, and Selfish
Genes
53 For  Midgley,  “gene  selfishness”  is  unworkable  because  genes  are  personified  and
treated as  conscious agents.  Even though,  Midgley argues,  Dawkins stresses  several
times that personification and talk of selfishness are just metaphorical conveniences,
“selfish” can not impute conscious motives to genes. Even though Dawkins attempts to
restrict and specialize the meaning of “selfish” as it extends to genes, he defines the
gene as “[t]he fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest” (Dawkins
2006, 11, emphasis added). Midgley (1979, 451) responds, “he has linked the notion of
self-interest quite gratuitously to a kind of subject for which it can make no sense at all.
The only possible unit of self-interest is a self, and there are no selves in the DNA.”
54 Midgley’s argument is not entirely successful if one adopts the “intentional stance,”
from which we view a system “as if” it were “a rational agent” (Dennett 1997, 35-54).
“Intentionality  in  the philosophical  sense,”  Dennett  summarizes,  “is  just  aboutness.
Something exhibits intentionality if  its competence is in some way about something
else.”  (1997,  39,  46-47;  emphases in  original.)  Adopting  the  intentional  stance,  no
necessary problems of selfhood, as posited by Midgley, arise from calling genes “selfish;”
we are treating genes “as if” they are rational agents in order to make predictions
about their “behaviour.” Nevertheless, there are fatal problems with the selfish gene
that  have  nothing  to  do  with  intentionality.  There  is  a  fundamental  conceptual
confusion, towards which Midgley gestures when she criticizes Dawkins for “mov[ing]
from saying ‘genes are selfish’ to saying ‘people are selfish’” (Midgley 1979, 448).
55 When Dawkins calls genes “selfish,” he means to restrict and specialize this term. His
“definitions of altruism and selfishness are behavioural, not subjective;” his definition of
gene selfishness “is concerned only with whether the effect of an act is to lower or raise
the  survival  prospects  of  the  presumed  altruist  and  the  survival  prospects  of  the
presumed  beneficiary.”  (Dawkins  2006,  4.)  Earlier,  however,  Dawkins  suggests,  “a
predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This
gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour.” (2006, 2.)
56 Genes’ “selfishness,” then, is to be stripped of any moral or broadly cultural baggage;
Dawkins is simply adopting the intentional stance. And as Rose points out, we must
realize that Dawkins means to describe the behaviour of genes; he is not talking about
genes for selfishness (Rose 1997, 201). But that he is not so speaking is, in a way, odd;
the sociobiological perspective, with which Dawkins aligns himself (see Dawkins 1985),
would seek or speculate as to the genetic bases of universal behaviours (see Wilson
2004). Here, the suggestion seems to be not that there are genes for selfishness, but that
human  selfishness  is  an  extension  of  the  special  “selfishness”  attributed  to  genes.
Having  restricted  the  meaning  of  gene  selfishness,  to  suggest  that  the  special
selfishness of genes is somehow mirrored by humans’ observable everyday selfishness
is surely to upset the distinction, on which Dawkins insists, between the word’s special
and everyday meanings.
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57 A “human society  based  simply  on  the  gene’s  law of  universal  ruthless  selfishness
would be a very nasty society in which to live,” writes Dawkins. “Let us try to teach
generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.” (Dawkins 2006, 3.) But Dawkins
should not  need this  disclaimer,  for  it  makes little  sense if  one takes seriously the
conceptual distinction between the two selfishnesses (special,  gene-level selfishness;
everyday human selfishness). There need be no direct link between gene and human
selfishness, but things get messy because Dawkins’s denial that the two concepts are
intrinsically linked – gene selfishness is “behavioural, not subjective” (Dawkins 2006, 4)
–  comes  after  two  statements  which  suggest  the  opposite  –  “gene  selfishness  will
usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour” (Dawkins 2006, 2); “[l]et us try
to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.”
58 Dawkins, then, suggests that his two selfishnesses are distinct, while moving between
them  as  if  the  phenomenon of  everyday,  human  selfishness  were  extrapolable  from
special, gene-level selfishness. At the same time, to add to the confusion, it would seem
that “everyday selfishness” is supposed to provide the material from which the “gene
selfishness” models is built and is made comprehensible:
At times, gene language gets a bit tedious, and for brevity and vividness we shall
lapse into metaphor. But we shall always keep a sceptical eye on our metaphors, to
make sure they can be translated back into gene language if necessary. (Dawkins
2006, 45.)
59 Dawkins fails to distinguish clearly between two quite different concepts for which he
uses the same word.18 “Gene selfishness” is not adequately theorized, not rigorously
enough separated from human selfishness,  to be a sensible model.  But,  in a crucial
sense,  neither is  everyday human selfishness  clearly  enough defined to  be either  a
helpful  point  of  contrast  for,  nor  a  basis  from  which  we  might  model,  “gene
selfishness.” Indeed, how could an emotivistic,  and therefore rather fuzzy,  notion –
one, that is, determined by cultural mores – provide such material or a benchmark,
without a good deal of linguistic topiary?
60 Although the intentional stance vindicates, to some extent, Dawkins’s talk of genes as if
they  are  conscious  agents,  Midgley’s  dissatisfaction  with  “gene  selfishness”  as  a
metaphorical  figure  (or,  in  our  further  refined  terms,  model)  still  stands.  In
constructing our models, we must surely begin with literal, or “first,” meanings, but
the literal  or  everyday  meaning  of  “selfish”  is  just  what  Dawkins  is  attempting  to
distinguish “gene selfishness” from. Dawkins needs a model by which something about
gene “behaviour” and genetic phenomena can be specified and illustrated. What I am
suggesting is that Dawkins’s terms are still not sufficiently clear in and of themselves,
nor  has  he  sufficiently  clarified  and specified  them,  for  this  to  be  achieved.  “Gene
selfishness” is not cogent enough a model for us to determine what difference it makes
to theory’s conceptual store; it cannot, therefore, offer much in the way of Rortyan
redescription: too much work remains to be done on what the concept is “about,” what
it means, in the first place.
61 The  influence  of  The  Selfish  Gene,  both  as  a  work  and  for  the  central  metaphor  it
introduced,  cannot be gainsaid.  “Three imaginary readers looked over my shoulder
while I was writing,” explains Dawkins: “the layman,” “the expert,” and “the student,
making the transition from layman to expert.” (Dawkins 2006, xxi, xxii.) Undoubtedly,
The  Selfish  Gene and  selfish  genes  have  had  a  profound  effect  on  the  public
understanding of genetics and evolutionary theory, and on “professional experts” in
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various fields. And Dawkins’s first book has certainly created a great deal of debate
among science commentators. This in itself is not insignificant, for it will remind those
who read widely enough that science is creative, dynamic, and in many cases far from
settled. But the cultural importance and influence of The Selfish Gene has nothing to do
with its theoretical utility, and on this count, unfortunately, it does not offer much.
 
Stephen Jay Gould: Adaptationism, Extrapolationism,
Pluralism
62 Dawkins  and  Dennett  speak  from  and  for  what  Gould  calls  the  “adaptationist
programme” – the view that natural selection is the only mechanism of change, and
that  all  change  is  gradual  and  adaptive,  conferring  ever  greater  fitness  on  the
organism. “We would not object so strenuously to the adaptationist programme,” wrote
Gould and Richard Lewontin in 1979, “if its invocation, in any particular case, could
lead in  principle  to  its  rejection for  want  of  evidence.”  Pervasive  adaptation being
virtually  an article  of  faith,  however,  the  possibility  of  non-adaptive  change is  not
considered, and theorists are satisfied merely with “consistency with natural selection”
(Gould & Lewontin 1979, 588).
63 Interestingly, the demand for the possibility of falsification here is much like Popper’s
(2002) principle of demarcation of science and metaphysics: Gould and Lewontin’s (as
well  as  Rose’s)  aim  has  been  to  challenge  what  we  might  call  the  metaphysics  of
pervasive adaptation and natural selection. The mere fact that an event can be made to
fit the theoretical mould prescribed by adaptationism does not mean that adaptationist
theory is absolutely true – in the crude way that “true” is often used – or the best
possible “fit” in all possible situations (or worlds). That events can be so moulded to
theory merely illustrates Goodman’s maxim that “Truth, far from being a solemn and
severe master, is a docile and obedient servant.” (1978, 18.) On occasion, Gould cites
instances where writers of the adaptationist mindset admit that evidence supporting
their views is wanting, and so assume that we simply haven’t found the evidence yet; it
must be there, somewhere, because we know adaptationism to be true. Much of Gould’s
energy was spent arguing that where such evidence is lacking, it is so not because we
have missed it, but because it is not and never has been there at all (e.g., Gould 2007d;
Gould & Lewontin 1979).  Gould’s  point at  such moments is  close to one made,  in a
different context, by Goodman: that, “[u]fortunately, dramatic violations often fail to
disturb dogma” (Goodman 1978, 73).
64 For Gould, the “adaptationist programme” is one with the belief that natural selection
is  the  only  mechanism  of  evolutionary  change  worth  considering.  The  idea  that
evolution consists in the accumulation, through natural selection, of micromutations
leading to ever greater fitness – an asymptotic approach towards perfection – has led,
Gould argues, to the conflation of the mechanism of natural selection with received
notions of fitness, complexity, and progress.19 “Adaptationism,” then, is closely allied
with “extrapolationism,” the belief that, natural selection being the only evolutionary
mechanism worth studying, we can extrapolate from findings at one evolutionary level
– the genetic – to all others.
65 In  opposition  to  “adaptationism”  and  “extrapolationism,”  Gould  introduced  several
concepts  in  support  of  a  pluralistic  general  theory  of  evolution.  Evolution,  Gould
Popular Science, Pragmatism, and Conceptual Clarity
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VI-1 | 2014
14
argued, is hierarchically ordered into several “tiers” of geological time, each tier with
corresponding, dominant evolutionary mechanisms. Before we look closely at one or
two key models in Gould’s work, however, we need to consider just what the differing
accounts  of  evolution  are  over  which  Gould  and  Dennett/Dawkins  disagree.
Adaptationism is one; but what of “extrapolationism,” mentioned briefly above
66 Gould’s  is  a  theory  of  the  severally  tiered  structure  of  evolution  and  its  various
mechanisms.  Because  he  seems  to  decentralize  natural  selection  (at  the  gene  level
especially),  Gould  has  been  accused  of  being  anti-Darwinian  (see  Dennett  1995,
262-312). However, he emphasizes:
I […] do not deny either the existence and central importance of adaptation, or the
production  of  adaptation  by  natural  selection  […]  I  do  not  deny  that  natural
selection has helped us to explain phenomena at scales very distant from individual
organisms […] But selection cannot suffice as a full explanation for many aspects of
evolution;  for  other  types  and  styles  of  causes  become  relevant,  or  even  prevalent,  in
domains both far  above and far  below the traditional  Darwinian locus of  the organism.
(Gould, 2007b, 441-2, emphasis added.)20
67 At issue for Gould, then, are units and levels of selection: at levels other than that of the
organism, mechanisms other than natural selection may play dominant roles. This is
Gould’s critique of “extrapolationism,” the doctrine that all evolutionary change takes
place first and foremost at the gene level,  and that higher-level changes are simply
“extrapolations”  from  there.  This  idea  he  aims  to  displace  with  his  “Darwinian
pluralism.”
68 As far as Gould himself is concerned, then, no denial of Darwin, nor of the “central
importance” – scientific or philosophical – of natural selection and adaptation. Neither
does he see himself as being in disagreement with Darwin; one of Gould’s favourite
passages from Darwin is that in which the great man himself reminds his reader that
“natural selection has been the main, but not the exclusive, means of modification.”21
What Gould disagrees with is that natural selection is both the exclusive mechanism of
evolutionary  change  and  sufficient  explanation  of  all  life’s  complexity.  Instead,  he
offers a hierarchical and pluralized model of evolutionary theory in which micro- and
macro-evolutionary levels and mechanisms are “decoupled” from one another (Gould
1980b, 126): different mechanisms of change operate as the prime (but not necessarily
exclusive) mover at each level. Think of Gould’s attempt to offer several “decoupled”
mechanisms as an attempt to offer a Goodman-esque model of many worlds within the
universe  of  evolutionary theory;  or,  if  one prefers  a  smaller  scale,  think of  him as
pointing  to  a  plurality  of  languages  spoken  within  the  evolutionary  world.  Gould
proposes “a general model of several rising tiers of time – with conventional Darwinian
microevolution  dominating  at  the  ecological  tier  of  short  times  and  intraspecific
dynamics;  punctuated equilibrium dominating the geological  tier  of  phyletic  trends
based on interspecific dynamics […]; and mass extinction […] acting as a major force of
overall macroevolutionary pattern[.]” (Gould 2002, 88.)
69 You cannot extrapolate from gene to individual organism, Gould maintains, because
“organisms  are  doing  the  struggling”  (qtd  Brockman  1995,  62).  “Selection  simply
cannot see genes and pick among them directly,” in significant part because organisms
exhibit “emergent properties,” the results of complex interactions of genes which are
not,  therefore,  explicable  in  terms  of  single  genes  for  x  (here,  we  return  to  Rose’s
territory)  (Gould  1980a,  90).22 Natural  selection,  then,  “must  use  bodies  as  an
intermediary” (Gould 1980a, 90). Furthermore, argues Gould by means of a neat passing
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metaphor, we must not confuse “bookkeeping” and “causes.” Because genes constitute
the lowest evolutionary level, they will “record” all changes; higher-level selection will,
of course, affect gene frequencies. But not all  genetic changes will  be felt at higher
levels.  So-called  “neutral”  substitution  –  molecular  changes  that  are  neither
advantageous nor disadvantageous – is a case in point here. On this view, genes should
not  be  portrayed  (as  they  appear  to  be  by  Dawkins,  Dennett,  and  other
extrapolationists) as the only causal agents of evolutionary change.23
70 But,  argues  Gould,  one  cannot  extrapolate  from  local  populations  of  organisms  to
species, either. “The decisive step in evolution,” he argues, is the macroevolutionary
step from one species to another (Goldschmidt, qtd Gould 1980b, 125). This, he suggests,
cannot be explained by gradual adaptation; species, to be recognizable as such, must
achieve stability for an extended period of time, while speciation occurs over thousands
rather than millions of years, a mere “moment” in geological/evolutionary time (Gould
2007d,  265).  The geologically instantaneous break between species  “requires  another
method than that of sheer accumulation of micromutations” (Goldschmidt, qtd Gould
1980b, 125). For speciation to occur, Gould insists, “reproductive isolation comes first
and  cannot  be  considered  as  an  adaptation  at  all”  because  it  is  a  random  and
unpredictable event (1980b, 124). “There is,” Gould concludes, “a discontinuity in cause
and  explanation  between  adaptation  in  local  populations  and  speciation;  they
represent two distinct, though interacting, levels of evolution.” (1980b, 124.)
71 In Gould’s evolutionary structure, no one level is reducible to another. In contrast, the
extrapolationist  account  sees  gene-level  selection as  the root  of  all  change.  But,  to
recap,  Gould  sees  the  adaptationist  account  as  a  confusion  of  causes  and
“bookkeeping:”  all  change  will  be  recorded  at  the  gene  level  by  changes  in  gene
frequency,  but this  does not prove that genes are the units  being selected.  Each of
Gould’s levels “interacts,” as he says, with those above or below, but each level remains
distinct, particularly as each tier is viewed not just in terms of the size of its units (the
gene,  the  organism,  the  species,  and  so  on),  but  also  temporally;  intra-  and  inter-
species change, as well as change at even higher levels, occur at different speeds.
 
“Greedy” Reductionism
72 While Gould’s theory does have plenty of room for the neo-Darwinist narrative, Gould
does not believe that this gene-level, gene-centric narrative is sufficient to account for
all evolutionary change at all levels. “The Darwinism of the modern synthesis,” Gould
writes,  is  “a  one-level  theory” that  reduces all  change  to  consequences  caused  by
“struggle  among  organisms  within  populations”  (2007c,  224).  From  the  Dawkins/
Dennett perspective, all evolutionary phenomena should be traceable back (or down) to
the gene level – a level even lower than that of the organism.
73 For  Dennett,  Gould’s  accusation  of  “reductionism,”  levelled  at  the  neo-Darwinists,
misses the point. Dennett (1995, 80-83) distinguishes between “greedy” reductionism –
the sort of short-sighted, sloppy reductionism of which, he thinks, we should be wary –
and  the  sort  of  reductionism  characteristic  of,  even  necessary  to,  good  theorizing
(where the job of theory is understood as simplification, and assisting in increasingly
accurate prediction). It is, believes Dennett, this second reductionism that good neo-
Darwinism  practises,  but  which  Gould  does  not.  Dennett’s  distinction,  however,
between  reductionisms  does  nothing  to  clear  up  the  dispute  between  our  warring
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camps.  It  is  easy  enough  to  accuse  Gould  of  being  blinkered  in  his  use  of
“reductionism;”  but,  with  their  staunch  faith  in  the  gene’s-eye-view  account  of
evolution, it is equally easy to accuse Dennett and Dawkins of precisely the “greedy”
reductionism against  which Dennett  cautions  us.  As  far  as  reductionism goes,  both
sides in the dispute may have identified chinks in their opponent’s armour, but none
big enough to admit a fatal blow.
74 Hopefully, all this will seem straightforward so far. But all I have done is to summarize
some  points  of  disagreement  between  two  warring  factions  on  the  battlefield  of
evolutionary theory. This has been necessary because we need to know just what is
being disputed, but also because, as we will see, Dennett fails to discredit, because he
misreads, Gould.
75 We can, then, discern easily enough on what our warring factions disagree; but we lay
readers are still no closer to being able to say who is right. Nor, though, are we likely to
get much closer. Just why will become clear by article’s end. First, we need a slightly
closer consideration of some of Gould’s key concepts, the supporting pillars on which
his grand, pluralistic theory rests.
 
Exaptations, Spandrels, and “Spandrels”
76 “Exaptations” and “spandrels” are forms of “secondary” adaptation, modifications that
arise  not for  present  purpose  (Gould  &  Vrba  1982;  Gould  &  Lewontin  1979).
“Exaptations” are adaptations that arose for one reason and were later coopted for
another  (such  as  the  emergence  of  feathers  for thermo-regulation;  their  later
cooptation to flight) (Gould 2007c, 231-33). “Spandrels” are the necessary by-products,
due to organisms’ structural constraints, of adaptive changes that are themselves later
used adaptively (the use by some but not all snail species of the shell’s umbilicus for a
brooding chamber, for example) (Gould 1997b). Dennett rejects the sense and use of
“exaptations” and “spandrels:” even if one cannot say that particular features arose
“for” their current use, surely it makes little sense to say that such features are not
adaptive  if  one  can say  that  the  current  uses  to  which  the  features  are  put  are
advantageous (Dennett 1995, 275-76). Further, Dennett (1995, 281) argues, secondary
adaptations are accounted for by orthodox theory; adaptations always develop from
prior structures that were once advantageous but are now obsolete.
77 Dennett goes to great lengths to dismiss “spandrels,” in particular, by exposing what he
sees as the idea’s figurative deficiency. In architecture, spandrels are the triangular
areas  left  over  when  an  archway  is  built  into  a  rectangular  wall.  In  their  famous
spandrels  paper,  Gould  and  Lewontin  begin  by  limning  the  ornately  decorated
structures that  draw visitors  to the Basilica di  San Marco.  Though these structures
attract  many  visitors,  the  writers  argue,  they  are there,  in  the  first  place,  out  of
structural necessity: they are the unavoidable result of placing a circular-based dome
on rectangularly arranged arches.
78 Dennett first argues that, strictly speaking, the structures to which Gould and Lewontin
refer are pendentives; spandrels proper are the approximately triangular spaces left
between adjacent archways running in line with one another. Dennett goes on to argue
that pendentives are not necessary; other structures are available, such as the squinch
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(constructed  by  filling  a  square  room’s  upper  corners,  thus  forming  an  octagonal
ceiling base) (Dennett, 1995, 271-73).
79 It is, of course, perfectly fair to scrutinize metaphorical “fitness.” Midgley (1979) does
just this when she criticizes Dawkins; and my criticisms of Dawkins have been based on
what I see as the incoherence of his “gene selfishness.” This incoherence arose in no
small part because Dawkins seemed to want to distinguish gene selfishness from human
selfishness, while all the time running the two together. But no such conceptual elision
occurs with Gould and Lewontin’s “spandrels.” Odd though this suggestion may sound,
there is a sense in which the word itself used to denote the concept Gould and Lewontin
wish to introduce matters relatively little; for, if the concept of adaptation’s necessary
by-products is made both recognizable and definable, we can surely take our pick of
shorthands: we are, after all, dealing with “spandrels” as a model in need of deliberate
specification, rather than as a poetic metaphor. In our current context, the question to
be  asked  is  whether  necessary  structural  by-products  –  call  them  “spandrels,”
“pendentives,” or “squinches” – can actually be identified in biological structures, to
which  Gould  answers  “yes”  (see  Gould  2002,  1179-1295;  Gould  1997b).  As  far  as
Dennett’s criticisms go, we are talking about the difference between imperfect, even
sloppy,  terminology  –  on  which  count  Dennett’s  criticisms  surely  stand  –  but  a
nonetheless coherent conceptual model – on which count they do not.
80 Strangely, too, there is a sense in which Dennett seems actually to make Gould’s case
for him. A dome placed on a circular base consisting of rectangularly arranged archways
will produce pendentives. (In this model, the dome and the archways are “adaptations,”
the pendentives “spandrels” – necessary structural by-products later used “adaptively”
as  surfaces  for  decoration.)  Squinches  will  produce  an  octagonal  base;  so  they  will
necessarily  produce  a  different  structure.24 Architectural  spandrels  are indeed
evolutionary  spandrels  in  Gould’s  figurative  sense,  resulting  unavoidably from  the
consecutive arrangement of arches in a wall. But so too are pendentives and squinches
figurative, Gouldian spandrels. They, too, are structurally forced, necessary.
81 Moreover, when Dennett (1995, 281) argues that secondary adaptation is accounted for
in his adaptationist orthodoxy, he appears to be playing to a dubious double standard:
he rubbishes, on the one hand, Gould’s concept of non-adaptive change; but on the
other, where he can find a space, however small, for Gould’s ideas, he suggests that
adaptationism has already taken care of things. In doing this, Dennett simply ignores
Gould’s  attempt  to  challenge  the  image  of  constant,  gradual,  progressive  change.
“Exaptation” and “spandrels” are key to a view of life in which success is marked by
stability and is enjoyed by simpler rather than ever more complex organisms – a view
very different from the one espoused by Dawkins and Dennett.
82 Dennett, then, has failed to demolish Gould’s concept of evolutionary “spandrels.” This
evolutionary concept  metaphor has  been very clearly  specified;  so  as  a  model  –  or
science metaphor – the term is rather stable, regardless of any infelicities as far as first,
or literal,  meaning goes.  With this  concept,  lay readers with scientific  interests are
hardly  disadvantaged;  they  might,  however,  end  up  red-faced  if,  with  Gould  and
Lewontin’s paper tucked under their arms, they were to pronounce upon architectural
matters at an architects’ convention.
83 This case of evolutionary spandrels is informative: it shows us that models, or science
metaphors, can be made to mean quite clearly even if labels’ first meanings have been
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misapplied; but this can only be done if models’ extensional ranges are carefully and
precisely delimited before their free and easy use.
84 Gould’s model of “spandrels” is coherent in a way that Dawkins’s “gene selfishness” is
not.  A  good thing,  too, for  it  is  one of  the  pillars  on which Gould’s  grand view of
evolution, one vastly different from what he sees as the reductionist orthodoxy of neo-
Darwinism, rests.  Take “spandrels” away, and you have a much smaller,  less sturdy
theory. “Spandrels” encapsulates and – if they are identifiable in nature, as Gould and
Lewontin believe they are – evidences non-adaptive change,  itself  a  key theoretical
feature of Gould’s grand evolutionary theory.25 Indeed, non-adaptive change is posited
in  direct  opposition  to  the  neo-Darwinist  narrative  of  untrammelled,  gradual,
“progressive”  change. It  is  by  chipping  away at  Gould’s  key  concepts  that  Dennett
hopes to discredit Gould.
85 Take  “gene  selfishness”  away  from  neo-Darwinism,  however,  and  you  remove  a
decidedly unclear concept, but nothing more; you do not disprove the neo-Darwinist
narrative.  Indeed,  Dawkins  himself  saw  The  Selfish  Gene as  adding  to,  or  further
clarifying,  neo-Darwininst  orthodoxy,  not  as  launching  a  brand  new  evolutionary
theory (see Dawkins 2006, xv, Ch.1). At most, he hoped that experts reading his book
might find in it “a new way of looking at familiar ideas” (2006, xxi); but at base, claims
Dawkins,  “[t]he selfish gene theory is  Darwin’s theory” (2006,  xv).  I  have not taken
issue with Dawkins over his preferred grand narrative, but over the clarity, coherence,
and theoretical utility of one of his key concepts.
 
Punctuated Equilibrium
86 Another Gouldian mechanism over which there has been much griping is “punctuated
equilibrium,” identified by Gould and Niles Eldredge (1977) as the phenomena of rapid
change  at  the  species  level,  followed  by extended  periods  of  stability.  Although
evolution  is  often  thought  of,  diagrammatically,  as  a  more  or  less  smooth  line
representing constant, adaptive change through time, in fact, Gould argues, success is
marked by  overall  stasis;  lack  of  fitness  forces  rapid  change  and/or  leads  to  rapid
extinction. That the diagrammatically step-like pattern of punctuated equilibrium is
dominant at  the species level  is,  Gould contends,  empirically supported:  gradualists
(those who believe in constant, gradual, micromutational change) are led, by virtue of
the perspective they already have, to believe that apparent “jumps” between species
suggest  gaps  in  the  fossil  records.  Gould  argues,  by  contrast,  that  reliable  records
suggest  that  interspecies  jumps  or  “saltations”  (in  terms  of  geological  time)  are
precisely what we are dealing with (Gould & Eldredge 1977; Gould 1980b; Gould 2007b).
87 Dennett rejects punctuated equilibrium on bare scientific and theoretical/conceptual
grounds. In certain respects, he argues, punctuated equilibrium is just bad science. But
where it  does work, punctuated equilibrium can still  be dismissed because the neo-
Darwinists got there first. For example, the step-like pattern Gould wishes to substitute
for the smoother lines of the gradualists is already recognized by and implicit in the
gradualists’ representations: under higher “magnification,” the gradualists’ lines reveal
themselves to be staircases (see Dennett 1995, 285-99). It is all a matter of scale; the
gradualists’ smooth lines represent overall change; the punctuationists’ steps the small,
logically necessary jumps between adaptations.
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88 But far from containing it, this inverts the punctuated equilibrium model. Punctuated
equilibrium is a keystone in Gould’s pluralized and hierarchical theory of evolution;
punctuational patterns are the dominant pattern of evolutionary change at relatively
high levels, not the necessary micro-structure of constant micromutation. “Punctuated
equilibrium” is the name – call it a metaphor if you will; “model,” given the foregoing
discussion, is better – that Gould and Eldredge give to the phenomena that produce
these patterns; it names a mechanism operating at a relatively high level of evolutionary
unit and time.
89 So  different  are  the  Dennett-Dawkins  and  Gould  positions,  in  fact,  they  do  not
theoretically cancel one another out. Certainly, Dennett’s account – that punctuations
can be seen in the fine-grained structure of the gradualist diagram – does not meet
Gould head-on. Dennett changes the game, but does not beat Gould at his own. Gould
wishes to incorporate ultra-Darwinism’s basic tenets while rejecting what he sees as its
reductionism, while Dennett wishes simply to dismantle Gould’s theory. He fails to do
so,  however,  because  he  either  misses  or  dodges  Gould  rather  than  blocking  or
cancelling him.
90 It seems disingenuous, and a little crude, to suggest that the usable bits of punctuated
equilibrium are already part of “orthodoxy,” while bits deemed unusable are simply
bad science.  To  do so  is  to  suggest  that  one’s  opponent  was  partly  right,  but  only
because  one  got  there  first.  To  say  this  is  to  credit  one’s  opponent  with,  at  best,
reiterating  what  has  been  said  before,  but  less  effectively  than  before.  More
importantly for us, though, such an approach as Dennett’s ignores that Gould, in this
case, has added to the language of evolutionary theory. It does not make sense to say of
someone’s coinage, “We developed that concept, we just didn’t name it.” It does not
make sense because there can be no unnamed concepts.  And yet,  this  seems to  be
Dennett’s strategy with the element of “punctuation” he will allow into his narrative.
91 Dennett does not, overall, like the idea named by “punctuated equilibrium,” but he has
not really shown us what is wrong with it – what about it is confused, incoherent, or
nonsensical  –  because  he  has  argued around it.  Moreover,  the  “punctuations”  that
Dennett does allow are so distant from Gould’s that it makes little sense to say that
Gould  is  simply  making  explicit  in  his  work  what  is  implicit  in  others’.  Precisely
because we are talking about new theory, models, concepts, it is equally senseless to
suggest  that  “punctuated equilibrium” contributes  nothing because  it  somehow lay
dormant but unacknowledged or unnamed in orthodox theory. Dennett and Gould are
talking  about  vastly  different  phenomena;  but  if  we  are to  talk  of  “punctuated
equilibrium,” we can hardly do so while suggesting that those who conceptualized it
have contributed nothing.  Dennett’s  criticisms of “punctuated equilibrium” seem to
rest on a misreading of Gould and Eldredge’s model – what and how it means, what it
names or denotes. It is easy enough to defend Gould and Eldredge, as I do, because they
have, in Goodman’s terms, “sold” this model in pretty clear and precise terms.
 
Conclusion
92 This article began with a problem: if a primary function of pop science is to take the
scientific word to the masses (who do not have access to primary research and are not
themselves  research-active  scientists),  then how are  engaged lay  readers  to  choose
between contradicting science narratives? Another way of phrasing this question is:
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given that pop science is written for the lay reader, how is this intended reader to gain
a point of critical entry into the genre?
93 One way, I have suggested (and an important way at that), of taking part in a critical
dialogue  with  pop  science  is  to  scrutinize  the  coherence  and  theoretical  utility  of
particular works’ central terms and concepts. This necessitated a consideration of the
difficulties of theorizing metaphor, at the end of which a rough schematic was drawn
up, in which science metaphors and poetic metaphors (or models and metaphors), and
passing and concept metaphors were distinguished. A concept model or metaphor is
theoretically  useful  if  it offers  something  in  the  way  of  what  Rorty  calls
“redescription;”  or,  it  encourages,  even  forces,  us  to  “think  otherwise,”  to  start
reshaping our theories about the world.
94 My arguments against Dawkins’s concept of “gene selfishness” turned on an attempt to
show that it is too confused a concept model to be theoretically useful. If we cannot say
with any certainty what a model models (that is, what a metaphor names or denotes),
then it can offer little to our conceptual storehouse.
95 Crucially,  my  argument  against  Dawkins  is  an  argument  against  the  clarity,  and
therefore the utility, of his most famous term; it is no argument against the coherence,
nor the “rightness” or “wrongness,”  of  neo-Darwinism itself.  To say that Dawkins’s
terms are not useful, then, is to say this: take away the concept of “gene selfishness,”
and the integrity of the neo-Darwinist narrative is hardly in danger. Quite the opposite,
in fact, as you remove a decidedly confused, and therefore confusing, idea.
96 In  this  article,  I  have  come  down,  unapologetically,  in  favour  of  Gould,  precisely
because  those  concepts  of  his  that  I  have  considered  do have  utility  in  the  sense
outlined above. “Punctuated equilibrium” and “spandrels” are keystones in his grand
view of  a  pluralistic  evolutionary structure.  Without  them, his  edifice  will crumble.
These  terms  encapsulate  structures  (spandrels)  or  mechanisms  (punctuated
equilibrium) around which Gould’s image of a “tiered” evolutionary structure is built. I
have also defended Gould on the count of coherence: Dennett fails, I have suggested, to
show how or why Gould’s concepts do not work. All he manages to do – but this he does
with great clarity and vigour – is  tell  us what his view of evolution is,  and that he
heartily disagrees with Gould (among others).
97 Why the pragmatist theoretical framework in all this? Firstly, it is not my suggestion
that,  in  order to  engage critically  with popular science,  one does not  have to be a
scientist so long as one is a pragmatist. Pragmatism – or, rather, the pragmatists on
whom I have drawn – makes sense of the linguistic-metaphorical terms in which we
might engage with popular science and a critique thereof. A pragmatist understanding
of metaphor, and the difficulties of theorizing metaphor comprehensively, helps shine
a spotlight on the central point of disagreement between science commentators like
Midgley, Dawkins, Gould, and Dennett. As we have seen, the disagreement is rarely over
scientific knowledge, per se, or definitions of such terms as “gene;” rather, it is over the
models  used  to  explore  the  organization  and/or  behaviour  of  such  terms.  The
pragmatists I have turned to in this paper help justify the approach to popular science
that I am advocating; but one does not have to be well-versed in Rorty, Goodman, and
Davidson in order to take this approach – hence the structure of this paper, with a
fairly stark division of theory and “case studies.”
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98 Secondly,  as  I  conceive  things,  Rortyan  redescription  is  an  invitation  to  critical
conversation. Gould, I maintain, does ask us to think otherwise; his models are coherent
and clearly specified – they are well “sold” – and the theory of which they are integral
parts does stand in marked contrast to a view of evolutionary change that he, along
with Rose, Dawkins, Dennett, and others, acknowledges as having achieved the status of
orthodoxy.26 It is in creative response to the gaps in orthodox theory that Gould offers
his  models,  which,  pace Rorty  and  Goodman,  re-make  the  linguistic  world  of
evolutionary  theory.  Dawkins’s  lack  of  clarity  does  nothing  to  diminish  the  neo-
Darwinist narrative, but it cannot be said to have truly added to it or our conceptual
storehouse.
99 I  have  outlined  a  way  by  which  non-experts,  those  not  fluent  in  the  language  of
evolutionary science, can join a critical conversation, rather than be captive to a genre
written, supposedly, for them. I have skirted the question “who’s right?” by asking,
instead,  “who’s  coherent  and theoretically  useful?”  But  what  of  this  first  question:
who’s right?
100 In  one  of  several  exchanges  between  himself  and  Gould,  and  responding  to  an
unfavourable  review from Gould,  Dennett  (1997b,  64)  writes:  “John Maynard Smith
praises my book [Dennett 1995]; Stephen Jay Gould attacks it. They are both authorities,
but they can’t both be right, can they?” This comment nicely encapsulates what has too
long diverted some of  pop science’s  better  known disputants;  indeed,  it  is  just  one
comment  in  a  protracted  argument  between  the  neo-  or  ultra-Darwinists  and  the
Radical Science movement.27 I now want to make the perhaps unwelcome claim that, in
a certain sense, there is very little for either the neo-Darwinists or Radical Scientists to
be “right” about,  in the context of  pop science.  I  mean this in the following sense:
assuming that the reader is a non-scientist, reliant on pop science for their scientific
“literacy,” the reader starts with the presumption that the pop-science writer believes
the version of science they are offering. The reader is not in a position to do otherwise
than start with the presumption that the “basic” science of a particular texts is “right”
(think,  for example,  of  the overall  theoretical  disagreement Midgley and Rose have
with Dawkins, despite the three agreeing on the basic definition of “gene”).
101 Coherence and utility,  rather than “rightness,”  are,  then,  a  more appropriate focus
when engaging with popular science specifically. The writers we have been considering
– writers whose works are read as populist educational texts and as exercises in science
theorizing/philosophizing – should not make the mistake of thinking that their job is
to tell us how the world just is. Their job, as popularizers and theorizers, is to clarify,
and point out the pitfalls of, the best theories the scientific community has to offer
about how it believes, to the best of its knowledge, the world just is.
102 Our  best  theories  are  those  which  seem  to  best,  or  better,  describe  and  make
predictions about the world; but, of course, it remains among scientists, philosophers,
and other interested parties, a matter of contention as to how we decide the bases on
which one theory is pronounced better than another.28 Clearly, this line of conversation
lies  outside the scope of  this  essay.  But  surely  the contingencies  and disputes  that
shape specialist fields of enquiry should equally shape and be present in discussions in
the popular arena. To be “wrong” in the pop science arena, then, is to have failed to
offer coherent second-order reports and clarifications of the sort mentioned above. Our
interests in the utility of certain pop-science texts, and the basis of the disagreements
we have considered, are then interpretive and, in a sense, aesthetic.
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103 My  view  of  what  popular  science  texts,  written  in  the  theoretical  mode,  should
understand themselves as doing, then, and of what they have to offer their readers, is
rather close to both Rorty’s and Oakeshott’s views about philosophy. Like philosophy,
pop  science  can  offer  second  order  criticisms  or  clarifications  of  clusters  of  ideas,
concepts, problems; but it must give up the idea that it is in the business of stating or
discovering  anything  like  firm,  unassailable,  immutable  truths  (Rorty  2009,  357-94;
Oakeshott, 1991).
104 One option for the critically concerned reader of pop science is that we attempt to test
the coherence and utility of certain arguments. As non-scientists, we are unlikely to be
in a position where we can dispute the fundamental rightness or wrongness of certain
theories. But we can chip away at the theories and models offered us, to see how robust
they are. We might not be able to prove or disprove the neo-Darwinists’ gene-centric
view of life,  but we can find problems in so influential a notion as the selfish gene
without having to retrain as geneticists.
105 The view I offer of pop science, and, particularly, theoretical works in the genre, is that
it  is  part  of  a  conversation  that  takes  place  across  boundaries  of  discipline  and
expertise. When not distracted by arguments over who was “right,” Gould was perhaps
better at this conversation than Dennett and Dawkins: rejecting the naturalistic fallacy,
he  would  “draw  no  somber  conclusions”  from  either  neo-Darwinism  or  his  own
evolutionary theories, for he “[did] not believe [...] that the answer to moral dilemmas
about meaning lies with the facts of nature, whatever they may be” (Gould 2007c, 235).
(This  contrasts  markedly  with  Dawkins’s  claims  about  neo-Darwinism’s  capacity  to
answer  the  “big  questions.”)  Repeatedly,  Gould  argued  for  “pluralism  in  guiding
philosophies,” for he accepted that “[g]radualism sometimes works well” (Gould 2007d,
266). However, given that “[w]e live in a world of enormous complexity,” it is possible
that more than one theory of evolutionary change might be needed if we are to avoid a
“simplistic caricature and distortion of [Darwin’s] theory.” For Darwin, Gould reminded
his readers, “cut to the heart of nature by insisting so forcefully that ‘natural selection
has  been  the  main,  but  not  the  exclusive,  means  of  modification’.”  Accepting  this,
Gould asked, “[w]hy should such a complex and various world yield to one narrowly
construed cause?” (Gould 2007b, 459.) Across Gould’s work there is space for several
theories of evolutionary modification; there must be if he is to make good his stated
pluralism.
*
106 The concept metaphors and models characteristic of popular science can add to our
common  conceptual  storehouse  in  profound  ways,  but  the  meanings  of  science
writing’s  concept  models  must,  in  the  first  instance,  be  sufficiently  specified  and
narrowed.  If  this  is  done,  the  way  is  prepared  for  later  metaphorical  and/or
paradigmatic applications and extensions of those terms (cast your mind back, for
example, to our earlier, passing mention of Dewey, who saw in Darwinian evolution a
ready metaphor for the dynamics of  cultural  change).  Midgley’s  pruning must  take
place initially,  so that these arborescent things we call  metaphors can grow all  the
more strong in  later  life,  and withstand these  later,  broader  –  what  we might  call
secondary – uses.
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107 In this article, I have attempted to show that, without recourse to specialist scientific
knowledge,  readers  of  pop science can ask –  and perhaps even answer –  questions
about the coherence and utility of particular works. (This, I hope it is clear, is entirely
different from simply asking whether works are difficult or not.) To ask such questions
of pop science is of public importance, because – with the genre’s defining function, the
education of an engaged but non-expert readership, in mind – if a work is not coherent
and theoretically useful in the ways we have been pursuing, then what good can it be to
its intended reader?
My thanks to Professor Robert Eaglestone (for the informal conversations and friendly
disagreements that marked the beginnings of this paper) and Professor Vincent Colapietro (for
his invaluable advice during the essay’s later stages of development).
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NOTES
1. The model  of  conversation,  and my privileging of  it,  here,  over argument,  is  drawn from
Oakeshott (1991).
2. In what follows, I have generally avoided argument rooted in favour of or discomfort with the
supposed cultural politics of the writers in question. Not that such questions are unimportant;
but such arguments have been made before, and look unlikely to be settled.
3. For an accessible,  speculative overview of the relationship between the arts,  sciences,  and
philosophy, see Rorty (2009b). On the impossibility of separating genres from one another, of
keeping them “pure,” see Derrida (1992).
4. In the passage to which I allude, Goodman makes the point that one does not argue for the
truth of a categorial system, “since it has no truth-value, but for its efficacy in world-making and
understanding. [...] For a categorial system, what needs to be shown is not that it is true but what
it can do. Put crassly, what is called for in such cases is less like arguing than selling” (1978, 129).
5. This section draws heavily on arguments developed in greater detail in Belas (forthcoming).
6. On this point, Rorty (1989) and Goodman (1978) are close to one another.
7. “First meaning”, as more or less synonymous with “literal meaning,” is taken from Davidson
(1986).
8. (3)  differs  from (2)  in  that  it is  not  a  case  of  misunderstanding,  but  rather  of  obscurity,
ellipticality, ambiguity etc. on the part of the writer.
9. This idea, commensurate with Goodman (1978), is broad: it allows for someone who is bilingual
or polyglot, and also for someone who is, say, both a scientist and an artist.
10. See Goodman (1976, 68-74; 1979).
11. On symbolic systems, or worlds, see Goodman (1978).
12. On  the  importance  of  context,  or  “background  assumptions”  (Searle),  to  meaning,  see
Davidson (1986) and Searle (1978).
13. Of course, metaphorically or literally are not the only ways in which sentences might be said
or intended. The point here is to do, again, with this fuzzy notion of context. Communication
succeeds if we realize that a sentence is uttered ironically, metaphorically, angrily, and so on; it
fails if we do not realize such ways and styles of utterance.
14. In Macbeth II.ii, following the murder of Duncan, Macbeth reports his imagined hearing of
“Sleep  no  more!  |  Macbeth  does  murder  sleep.”  In  this  context,  the  claim  “Macbeth  is  a
murderer”  might  be  considered  both  literally  and  metaphorically  true.  Things  are  not
complicated by the fact  that  Shakespeare’s  Macbeth is  a  fictionalized character  (on this,  see
Goodman 1976, 21-26).
15. See also Wilson (2011)  on the difference between causation and content in metaphorical
expressions.
16. See chapter 4, Dawkins (1999, 55-80); Dawkins and Krebs (1979). For critiques, see Rose (1997);
Rose  and  Rose  (1976);  Haraway  (1991,  217-21);  Midgley  (1979),  (1983).  For  statements  and
defences of Dawkins’s position, see especially Dawkins (2006), (1981), (1999).
17. This is the “Panglossian Paradigm” (see Gould and Lewontin [1979]; Rose [1997, 230-37]).
18. .  That  Dawkins  also  views  the  use  of  metaphor  as  a  (metaphorical?)  “lapse”  contrasts
informatively with the more serious views of metaphor taken by Rorty, Goodman, and Davidson.
19. Gould makes this and related rguments often. See, for example, Gould (2002), (1980), (1994),
(2007b);  Gould and Lewontin (1979).  Sections II  and III  in Gould (2007a) provide an excellent
overview of Gould’s evolutionary theories.
20. For criticism of Gould, see Maynard Smith, Dennett, and Gould (1993); Dennett (1997b).
21. Darwin (2008, 8).  See, e.g.,  Gould (2007b, 438; 1994, 85; 2002, 147, 254), Gould & Lewontin
(1979, 155).
22. For Gould on emergent properties, see Gould (1980b).
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23. See  Gould  (2007c,  233);  Smith,  Dennett,  &  Gould  (1993).  Kimura’s  (1968;  1983)  theory  of
neutralism is crucial to Gould’s critique of genetic fundamentalism.
24. See Rose’s defence of spandrels (Rose, 1997, 235-57).
25. The importance of non-adaptive change to Gould’s grand theory, as Gould himself understood
it,  is  indicated  by  the  space  it  gets  in  his  formidable  Structure  of  Evolutionary  Theory (2002):
chapters 9, 10, and 11, which deal with mechanisms and phenomena of non-adaptive change,
take up some 550 pages of this roughly fourteen-hundred-page work.
26. See, passim but especially Part III, Gould (2007); Rose (1997, vii-xii); Dawkins (2006, xv, Ch.1);
Dennett (1995, passim).
27. The literature on the ideological,  philosophical,  and scientific  disputes  between the neo-
Darwinists  and  Radical  Science  movement  is  substantial.  However,  refer  to  the  following:
Dawkins (1981; 1985; 2006, especially the final endnote, page 331-32); Dennett (1995, especially
the chapter on Gould; 1997b); Gould (1997a; 2007b; 2007c), and the editors’ introductions to Gould
(2007);  Rose  (1997),  throughout  but  especially  his  introduction;  Rose  and  Rose  (1976);  Rose,
Lewontin, Kamin (1990); Smith (1995); Smith, Dennett, Gould (1993). For a warning against the
uncritical, wholesale “culturalization” of science, see, of course, Sokal (1996).
28. This dispute hinges, in part, on debates between realists and anti-representationalists, and
arguments  as  to  how  or  if  language  hooks  onto  the  world.  The  issue  is  complex,  but  good
introductions  may  be  found  in  a  number  of  Rorty’s  (1998)  essays,  especially  his  extended
commentary on Dennett (98-121).
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